expressio unius造句

• Neither Bailey nor Eban mention the common law maxim " expressio unius est exclusio alterius ".
• J Thomas states that Petitioner's argument of implicit prohibition relies on the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
• The government is perhaps making an expressio unius argument based upon the existence of s6512 ( b ) ( 3 ) ( C ).
• Nor was any satisfactory reason offered to us why the rule " Expressio unius est exclusio alterius " should not apply to it.
• In other words, the principle of " expressio unius " may be more applicable as a limitation upon congressional power than upon executive power.
• For example, any originalist or even a strict constructionist might apply the canon of construction " expressio unius est exclusio alterius ", which presumes that when an author includes one example he intends to exclude others.
• At risk of wikilawyering, expressio unius est exclusio alterius-- the fact that some article probations include a 1RR restriction and this one did not led me to reasonably believe that adhering to 1RR was more than reasonable behavior.
• Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius : Congress'enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.
• ;" Expressio unius est exclusio alterius " ( " the express mention of one thing excludes all others " ) : Items not on the list are impliedly assumed not to be covered by the statute or a contract term.
• New York argued that this explicit requirement implicitly excluded any requirement for states to return non-fugitive slaves, by the principle " expressio unius exclusio alterius " ( " the express mention of one thing excludes others " ).
• While that could be read to suggest that any controversies under the 1933 Act were outside the contract and thus inarbitrable, " we do not think the principle of " expressio unius est exclusio alterius " is here applicable, " Swan wrote.
• The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in " Gibson v . Matthews ", 926 F . 2d 532, 537 ( 6th Cir . 1991 ) that the Ninth Amendment was intended to vitiate the maxim of " expressio unius est exclusio alterius " according to which the express mention of one thing excludes all others:
• The Security Council Resolution 242 article contains a subsection, about a common law maxim " Expressio unius est exclusio alterius " which is sourced to Danielle R . Sassoon, " The Unmaking of U . N . Resolution 242 : The Story of how Resolution 242 was Undone Before it was Even Finished ", New Society, Harvard College Student Middle East Journal, September 7, 2007.
• The Court concludes that " expressio unius " does not help petitioners because the " thing to be done " as prescribed by the statute ( and because of which all other " things " are excluded ) is simply a guarantee that employees will be allowed to make some use of compensatory time upon request, rather than an open-ended promise that employees will be able to choose ( subject only to the " reasonable time " limitation ) how to spend it.
• Implying that the Court accepts the expressio unius canon of interpretation, J . Thomas cites to Raleigh & Gaston R . CO . v . Reid, decided in 1872, and states that the Court accepts the proposition that " [ w ] hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode . " J . Thomas, pulling dicta from Reid, defines the " thing to be done " not as the " expenditure of compensatory time, " but rather as " a minimal guarantee that an employee will be able to make some use of compensatory time when he requests to use it ."